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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—THE CAGE A FETISH CAN BUILD: 
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURES 
IN SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS 
Anne R. Izzi* 
Currently over five thousand individuals are indefinitely confined in 
the United States with little hope of release.  The 1990s brought a wave 
of sex offender policy reform, creating Sexually Violent Predator Acts 
that allowed certain sex offenders to be detained after the completion 
of a sentence.  Legislatures reason that some offenders have mental 
defects that cause them to lose the ability to control their violent 
behaviors, and until that mental defect is resolved they pose too great 
of a risk to live in the community.  However, without precise 
definitions of mental defects or effective treatment options, these 
offenders are facing the probability of life-long commitment.  Until 
researchers discover sex offender treatment methods that can provide 
them with a realistic chance of release, the government should limit 
sex offender civil commitments to those persons who have serious 
mental illnesses and not merely “mental abnormalities,” in addition to 
specified offenses that further the goal of the statutes.  Given that there 
are extensive and effective safeguards in place for sex offenders living 
in the community, confining these offenders is not always necessary 
to protect the public.  If the states narrowed the scope of who could be 
adjudicated a sexually violent predator there would be fewer civil 
commitments, and therefore a better balance between the state’s 
interest in protecting the public and the offender’s interest in retaining 
liberty. 
INTRODUCTION 
“The state’s interest in public safety must outweigh the individual’s 
liberty interest in remaining free from involuntary commitment.”1 
In the state of Virginia, a fourteen-year-old boy and his twelve-year-
old girlfriend had sex, an interaction which would later be the foundation 
for the fourteen-year-old’s indefinite confinement by the state.2  After 
 
*  Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2017.   
1.  Jason A. Cantone, Rational Enough to Punish, but Too Irrational to Release: The 
Integrity of Sex Offender Civil Commitment, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 693, 704 (2009).  
2.  Galen Baughman, Questionable Commitments, CATO UNBOUND (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/06/01/galen-baughman/questionable-commitments 
[https://perma.cc/FJ4Y-UMQY].  
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serving four years in juvenile detention for the statutory crime, he was 
released into the community as a registered sex offender subject to the 
same conditions as every other offender with a similar offense.3  When 
Virginia sent the boy back to jail for a technical violation of the sex 
offender registry requirements, he was still paying the price for that initial 
incident when he was fourteen.4  The repercussions were far from over.  A 
Virginia court declared this young man to be a “Sexually Violent 
Predator” upon his release from state prison and indefinitely committed 
him to a different state facility.5  The state of Virginia did not violate 
double jeopardy protections because this detention was not considered to 
be punishment.6  They were merely protecting the public from his 
potential for offending based solely on his non-violent sexual interaction 
at age fourteen.7  This boy may be, eventually, released from the civil 
commitment facility, but he will never be released from the stigma of 
being adjudicated a sexually violent predator. 
Sexually violent predators are a class of criminals that repulse the 
general public.8  Mass media takes this revulsion and amplifies it, pushing 
public fear of sex offenders to the point where the delusion that an enraged 
child molester is around every corner becomes a societal reality.9  
Exceptional and gruesome crimes against children are presented by the 
media as a global issue instead of the anomaly that they truly are.10  During 
 
3.  Id.  
4.  Id.; see Cecelia Klingele, Criminal Law: Rethinking the Use of Community 
Supervision, 103 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1047 (2013).  A “technical violation” is a 
violation of the rules set out in a community supervision order when an offender is being 
monitored upon release.  Id.  These rules for probation can include abstaining from alcohol, 
socializing with other felons, or abiding by a curfew.  Id. at 1030 n.76.  Technical violations are 
a way in which released offenders return to prison absent the commission of a new crime.  Id. 
at 1047. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).   
7.  Baughman, supra note 2. 
8.  Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2007), http://www nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/5J2B-DQGZ].  In 1994, Leroy Hendricks was the first man to be committed 
under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.  Id.  He had only been released into the 
community for two days before being forced back into the facility due to a community petition.  
Id.  The mother leading the petition to remove Hendricks from the community commented, 
“[y]ou can tell me that he’s old, but as long as he can move his hands and his arms, he can hurt 
another child.”  Id. 
9.  ROGER N. LANCASTER, SEX PANIC: AND THE PUNITIVE STATE 26 (2011).   
10.  Id. at 25–26.  Journalists use these notable and outrageous cases to sell their work 
because society today craves constant stimulation.  Id.  In this “world where everyday 
experience has been rendered increasingly full of simulations such as television shows, video 
games, online worlds—virtual realities,” people are not interested in reading about everyday 
occurrences; they need to be excited by the virtual.  Id.  
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the height of hysteria, a newspaper published a comment warning that 
“[e]veryone should be treating their neighborhood as if a sex offender is 
lurking there.”11  Sex offenders constitute a category of society that is 
denigrated to such a degree that they can be, and are, constitutionally, 
indefinitely confined.  This indefinite confinement generally has the 
practical consequence of becoming life imprisonment under the guise of 
public necessity.12 
Lawmakers have distorted this fictitious fear and codified it by way 
of Sexually Violent Predator Acts (“SVPA”).13  Under these laws, sex 
offenders are subject to life imprisonment masked as preventative 
detention through civil commitment schemes.14  SVPAs consist of three 
elements that must be proven in order to commit an offender: a prior sex 
offense conviction, a mental abnormality, and a showing that this mental 
abnormality causes the offender difficulty controlling his behavior.15  In 
order to be released from a civil commitment facility, the offender must 
present evidence that his condition has changed to the extent that he no 
longer meets the qualifications of a sexually violent predator.16  These 
laws use overly broad and discretionary legal elements, creating a nearly 
 
11.  Gene Warner, 2 Sex Offenders Say They Don’t Deserve Harsh Label, BUFFALO 
NEWS, December 27, 1999, at 1B. 
12.  Cantone, supra note 1, at 727 (arguing civil commitment is merely a pretext for 
indefinite detainment).  While Minnesota has committed more than seven hundred individuals 
in the past twenty-one years, it has only released four of those seven hundred.  Brian Bakst, 
Judge Orders Review of All Minnesota Sex Offenders in Civil Commitment, FOX 9 (Oct. 29, 
2015 4:52 PM), http://www fox9.com/news/40851395-story [https://perma.cc/G22G-CLE2].  
13.  Throughout the states, these laws have different names for the Acts and terms for the 
offender, but this Note will use “Sexually Violent Predator” to refer to all state Acts.  See, e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2014) (“Sexually Violent Person”); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 123A, § 1 (2015) (“Sexually Dangerous Person”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1211 (2009) 
(“Dangerous Sex Offenders”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01 (2015) (“Sexually Dangerous 
Individual”).  
14.  Melissa Hamilton, Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental Disease, 33 PACE L. REV. 
536, 552 (2013). 
15.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (2013).  
16.  WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(4) (2014). 
(b)  A new trial proceeding under subsection (3) of this section may be ordered, or a 
trial proceeding may be held, only when there is current evidence from a licensed 
professional of one of the following and the evidence presents a change in condition 
since the person’s last commitment trial proceeding: 
(i)  An identified physiological change to the person, such as paralysis, stroke, or 
dementia, that renders the committed person unable to commit a sexually violent act 
and this change is permanent; or 
(ii)  A change in the person’s mental condition brought about through positive 
response to continuing participation in treatment which indicates that the person meets 
the standard for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative or that the person 
would be safe to be at large if unconditionally released from commitment. 
Id.  
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insurmountable hurdle when attempting to prove offenders no longer pose 
a danger to the public.17  If there is no clear description of the mental 
abnormality that initially placed the offender in a facility, then there also 
will be a lack of clarity for what is necessary for release.18 
Currently, twenty states have codified civil commitment programs, 
with New York enacting a statute as recently as 2007.19  The purpose of 
adjudicating a sex offender as a sexually violent predator is to protect the 
public from extremely dangerous offenders—rather than from every sex 
offender.20  In practice, however, these laws have a different effect.  As a 
result of statutes being overly vague in their mental abnormality and 
offense requirements, states are committing sex offenders who do not pose 
the extreme public danger the statutes were enacted to target.21  Under 
these statutes, courts commit sex offenders for offenses that are not 
necessarily violent and mental “abnormalities” that are not necessarily a 
disease or societal danger.22  Legislatures intentionally write SVPAs in a 
way that can be interpreted broadly in order to reach a greater number of 
offenders, and judges possess overwhelming discretion in deciding 
whether the offender satisfies the commitment requirements.23  The 
 
17.  See infra Part I.B. 
18.  See infra Part IV.B.  
19.  Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, ASS’N FOR TREATMENT SEXUAL 
ABUSERS, http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-violent-predators 
[https://perma.cc/V93C-B64A].  Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin are states 
that have enacted civil commitment laws.  Id.  
20.  WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014) (“A small but extremely dangerous group of 
sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them 
appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the [general involuntary civil commitment 
statute].”). 
21.  Id. 
22.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
686 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].  For example, some courts have relied on the existence 
of a paraphilia when “a paraphilia by itself does not necessarily justify or require clinical [or 
legal] intervention.”  Id.  See also Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 2010).  The 
doctor who evaluated Mr. Brown and determined he had a mental abnormality, later “admitted 
that the indicators used to reach a diagnosis of paraphilia NOS non-consent were not identified 
in the DSM; instead, they were indicators Dr. Doren himself had identified to bridge the gap or 
deficiency [that] . . . exist[s] in the DSM[].”  Id.  In spite of the doctor’s confession on cross-
examination, the court held Mr. Brown met the requirements under Wisconsin’s SVPA.  Id. at 
617.  “NOS” is an acronym for the “paraphilia not otherwise specified” category.  Michael B. 
First, DSM-5 and Paraphilic Disorders, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 191, 198 (2014).  This 
term is used to diagnose people who display an atypical sexual focus that impairs functioning, 
but who do not adhere to one of the enumerated paraphilic disorders.  Id.  The DSM-5 further 
divided the NOS category in two and renamed them “other specified disorder” and “unspecified 
disorder.”  Id. 
23.  N.J. STAT. § 30:4-27.26(b) (2008).  A predicate offense can include “any offense for 
which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of the 
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United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that infringing on a 
person’s liberty requires there be an overriding state interest necessitating 
such action; and, although liberty is not an absolute right, it requires a high 
standard to be taken away.24 
The severity of loss of liberty implicated by civil commitment 
dictates an evaluation of its appropriateness relative to the state’s valid 
interest in protecting the public, which is the intended purpose of the 
laws.25  This Note argues the current model of sex offender civil 
commitment does not adequately balance the interest of a sex offender’s 
liberty with the interest of the state in protecting the public.  Too much 
weight is being given to the state’s interest at the expense of sex offenders’ 
liberties.  When the Supreme Court has been presented with the 
opportunity to clarify the statutes as issues of constitutionality arise, it has 
only reinforced the vague terminology.26 
Additionally, this Note considers the issue of access to treatment that 
could promote a material change in an offender’s mental condition.27  
States may release an offender upon a showing that the offender’s mental 
condition has changed, resulting in the offender no longer posing a danger 
to the public.28  However, the Supreme Court ruled sex offenders do not 
have any constitutional right to receive treatment while they are in 
facilities.29  And even the facilities that do offer treatment are not 
beneficial because, as of yet, researchers in the field have not found any 
successful treatment options.30  Thus, offenders effectively receive a life 
 
case, the person’s offense should be considered a sexually violent offense.”  Id. 
24.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987) (The “right [to liberty] may, 
in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the 
greater needs of society.”).  In Jacobson, the Court held the right to liberty is not always 
absolute, even in civil settings.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“There are 
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.”).   
25.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01(a) (2013).   
Because the existing civil commitment procedures under [the general involuntary 
civil commitment statute] are inadequate to address the special needs of sexually 
violent predators and the risks they present to society, the legislature determines that 
a separate involuntary civil commitment process for the potentially long-term control, 
care and treatment of sexually violent predators is necessary.   
Id. 
26.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997).  The Hendricks Court reiterated its 
position that it has “traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature 
that have legal significance” and it will not depart from that tradition.  Id.   
27.  See infra Part II.  
28.  WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(4) (2014). 
29.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).  While admitting that treatment 
would be preferable, the Court concluded that the Constitution does not prevent “a State from 
civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger 
to others.”  Id.   
30.  David W. Nordsieck, How the Professional Judgment Standard Could Undermine 
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sentence when they are civilly committed, without hope of “recovering” 
from the “mental abnormality” that placed them there. 
This Note will explain the issues sex offender civil commitment laws 
create, both substantively and procedurally.  Section I.A will discuss the 
social atmosphere that gave rise to new laws aimed at sex offenders, 
including the impact media coverage had on particular influential cases.  
Section I.A.1 presents and describe specific child victim cases and the 
legal reaction they provoked.  Section I.B explains the common elements 
and themes in SVPAs, including procedural aspects.  This Section will 
then take an in-depth look at the formulation of prerequisite offense 
requirement and the mental abnormality requirement that are part of every 
Sexually Violent Predator Act. 
Section II will begin by explaining the constitutional rights 
afforded—or not afforded—to offenders in this commitment scheme.  The 
Section will go on to discuss the treatment rights of those committed and 
the difference in treatment as it relates to changing jurisdictions.  The 
Supreme Court holds that sex offenders in civil commitment settings have 
no right to treatment.  However, some jurisdictions have set a higher 
standard for treatment and other programming requirements.  
Nevertheless, the issue is not treatment standards, but rather the current 
lack of any viable treatment methods in the field of sex offender 
management. 
Section III will address ways in which sex offenders not in 
commitments are supervised and argue that those same methods would be 
safe and effective for more serious offenders who are currently 
committed.  These community supervision structures include registration 
and notification, residency restrictions, internet restrictions, and GPS 
monitoring.  Doing so would retain the state’s interest in protecting the 
public as offenders would be subject to numerous restrictions while at the 
same time respecting their right to liberty.  While it is conceded that living 
in the community, even under the most severe restrictions, would not 
provide adequate protection from a minute percentage of offenders, there 
is a large portion to whom these community restrictions would safely 
apply. 
Finally, Section IV will propose linguistic changes to SVPAs in order 
to rectify the current problem of overly broad requirements, and if applied 
correctly will reroute offenders who previously would have been 
committed into community supervision settings.  This Note proposes state 
legislatures narrow the statutory focus with regard to who can be 
adjudicated a sexually violent predator.  This can be accomplished by 
 
the Validity of Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2011). 
2017] THE CAGE A FETISH CAN BUILD 147 
removing vague language and provisions that allow wide judicial 
discretion.  The “mental abnormality” language should be replaced with 
specified mental diseases, and the predicate offenses replaced with 
enumerated offenses.  In this way, offenders’ liberties will be better 
protected and the public also will remain protected. 
I. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACTS 
“Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify 
the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.”31 
A. Social Origins of Sexually Violent Predator Acts 
Sex offenders are victims of a moral panic.32  A moral panic is a 
“mass movement that emerges in response to a false, exaggerated, or ill-
defined moral threat to society and proposes to address this threat through 
punitive measures.”33  Moral panics prey on the imagination because they 
are “part real, part imagined,” conferring exaggerated characteristics onto 
a real scapegoat.34  Periods of rapid social change provide a ripe 
environment to twist a disturbing event into an extraordinary fear. 
The media is to blame for fueling these intense fears because it calls 
attention to the most extreme and rare cases, even more so with the rise of 
the internet.35  The extraordinary sex offense cases make the news simply 
because they are extraordinary, rather than “ordinary.”  Further, state 
legislatures are to blame for codifying the unrealistic fear there are sexual 
predators around every corner into law as “panic [became] the prod and 
rationale for lawmaking.”36  The notable kidnapping and molestation 
cases described below exemplify the moral panic surrounding sex 
offenders, as the public applies characteristics from few violent offenders 
to the entire sex offender population. 
1. The Crimes Against Children Cases 
“Currently, no other population [than sex offenders are] more 
despised, more vilified, more subject to media representation, and more 
 
31.  O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
32.  LANCASTER, supra note 9, at 23. 
33.  Id.  Some examples of moral panics include witch hunts, McCarthyism, and Nazism.  
Id. at 23–24.  Two key ingredients in each of these examples, and in the moral panic around sex 
offenses, are an imaginary threat and a real group that is portrayed unrealistically.  Id. at 24. 
34.  Id. at 25.  
35.  Id. at 26. 
36.  Id. at 78; see also Richard G. Wright, From Wetterling to Walsh: The Growth of 
Federalization in Sex Offender Policy, 21 FED. SENT. R. 124, 126 (2008).  “Offenders may even 
stay on their state’s registry after they die . . . [a]pparently even in death, sex offenders are still 
dangerous.”  Id. at 125. 
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likely to be denied basic human rights.”37  The taboo nature of sex 
offenders’ crimes makes them an ideal target for moral panic.38  In the 
1980s, there was a 486% increase in the incarceration rates for sex 
offenders, both because of the rise in rape reporting specifically39 and 
because of the sex panic generally.40  In the 1990s a number of highly 
publicized cases where children were victims of sexual assaults and 
murders spurred new laws,41 which were aimed at punishing perpetrators 
who committed violent sex crimes against children.42 
a. Jacob Wetterling 
In 1994 the federal government passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act43 
(“Wetterling Act”).  The Wetterling Act became one of the first legal 
symbols of the public outcry against sex offenders—the beginning of a 
series of similar statutes aimed at disproportionately punishing sex crimes 
and protecting children.44  The Act is named after Jacob Wetterling, an 
eleven-year-old boy from Minnesota who was abducted while riding his 
bike and whose body was not found until twenty-seven years later.45  The 
 
37.  Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism 
Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
38.  LANCASTER, supra note 9, at 25. 
39.  Id. at 26. 
40.  Id. 
41.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 2 (1996).  “[N]o type of crime has received more attention 
in recent years than crimes against children involving sexual acts and violence.  Several recent 
tragic cases have focused public attention on this type of crime and resulted in public demand 
that government take stronger action against those who commit these crimes.”  Id.  The Bill 
aimed at amending the Wetterling Act to include Megan’s law expressed the government’s need 
to respond to the public’s rising concern and fear about recent sex offenses.  Id.  In addition, 
through this Bill the government acknowledges that the public outcry does have an influence on 
the legislative process.  Id.   
42.  LAURA J. ZILNEY & LISA ANNE ZILNEY, PERVERTS AND PREDATORS: THE MAKING 
OF SEXUAL OFFENDING LAWS 83 (2009); see also Wright, supra note 36, at 124 n.4.  The author 
here provides a listing of child victims who were the faces behind the Adam Walsh Act 
specifically and discusses the rise in sex offender legislation generally.  Id. 
43.  Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act (the “Wetterling Act” or “Megan’s Law”), PUB. L. NO. 104-145, 110 Stat. 
1345 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071), repealed and replaced by Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).   
44.  Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 435, 450 (2010). 
45.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 85; Erik Ortiz, Man Admits to Abducting, Killing 
Jacob Wetterling, Missing Minnesota Boy in 1989,  NBCNEWS (Sep. 7, 2016, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/man-admits-abducting-killing-jacob-wetterling-
missing-minnesota-boy-1989-n643506 [https://perma.cc/UX4R-Q5NB].  On September 6, 
2016, Danny Heinrich confessed to abducting, molesting, and killing Jacob twenty-seven years 
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Wetterling Act required every state to have a system of registration for sex 
offenders, and, subsequently, was amended to also include community 
notification laws.46  The registry included the offender’s address in order 
for public officials to readily locate a registrant during the investigation of 
future crimes committed in a registrant’s vicinity.47 
b. Megan Kanka 
The Wetterling Act was amended in 1996 to include Megan’s Law, 
which required states to make their sex offender registries available to the 
public.48  The federal government believed “[w]here a state has 
information through its registration system concerning a child molester or 
other sexually violent criminal who poses a continuing danger to others, 
the State should not withhold this information from persons who need it 
for the security of themselves and their families.”49  After serving his 
sentence for a prior offense against a child, Jesse Timmendquas raped and 
murdered his child neighbor, Megan Kanka.50  Megan’s Law was a 
reaction to Megan’s mother’s assertion that if she and the community were 
made aware of the sex offender living next-door Megan’s murder would 
not have happened.51  Megan’s Law was first enacted in New Jersey,52 
where Megan’s murder occurred, and was quickly followed by other states 
and the federal government,53 reflecting the growing nationwide frenzy to 
 
earlier.  Id. 
46.  Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act (the “Wetterling Act” or “Megan’s Law”), PUB. L. NO. 104-145, 110 Stat. 
1345 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071), repealed and replaced by Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).   
47.  Id.  When a sex or child crime occurs in a particular neighborhood or area, police 
will use the registry to identify and question registrants who are currently living in that same 
geographic area.  Id.  Local registered sex offenders automatically come under suspicion 
because of their existence in the registry.  See id.  
48.  Megan’s Law, PUB. L. NO. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 
14071(d) (1994)) (“The designated State law enforcement agency . . . shall release relevant 
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to 
register under this section.”).   
49.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 5 (1996).   
50.  See generally State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999). 
51.  Megan’s Law § 14071(d); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX 
OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 48 (Sept. 2007), http://www hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf [http://perma.cc/FT5P-GS4A]. 
52.  N.J. STAT. §§ 2C:7-1–7-11 (2015).  The New Jersey Legislature enacted this statute 
because “[t]he danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who commit other 
predatory acts against children . . . require a system of registration that will permit law 
enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the public safety.”  N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1. 
53.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 87.   
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protect children from the imagined ubiquitous sexual predator.54  With this 
enactment, the community could discover where sex offenders were 
living, expanding the reach of previous registration laws that gave 
exclusive access to law enforcement.55  The method of community 
notification varies based on the offender’s level of dangerousness and 
specific state regulations.56  Notification can be as simple as updating the 
public sex offender website or as deliberate as law enforcement 
distributing fliers door-to-door.57 
c. Amber Hagerman 
The federal AMBER Alert System in place today was adopted from 
Texas, where the system was first established to find missing children.58  
Nine-year-old Amber Hagerman is the name behind the missing child 
system that is currently used in every state.59  In addition to reflecting its 
namesake, the AMBER alert system also stands for America’s Missing: 
Broadcast Emergency Response because it broadcasts information about 
abductions through a variety of mediums.60 
d. Jessica Lunsford 
Following the abduction of Jessica Lunsford in 2005,61 over thirty 
states established twenty-five-year mandatory minimums for offenders 
who are convicted of sexually assaulting a child twelve years of age or 
 
54.  Id.  There were concerns that the availability of the registry would further stigmatize 
and punish sex offenders, but they were ultimately outweighed by the concern for public safety.  
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 5 (1996). 
55.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 5 (1996). 
56.  LEILAH GILLIGAN, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., FACT SHEET: WHAT YOU 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS 6 (2008), http://www.csom.org/
pubs/needtoknow_fs.pdf [https:// http://perma.cc/V2HW-FP3N]. 
57.  Id.  Community notification can also take the form of posting fliers in the 
neighborhoods or holding community meetings to inform the neighbors when a sex offender 
moves into the area.  Id. 
58.  AMBER Alert: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: OFF. JUST. 
PROGRAMS, http://www.amberalert.gov/faqs htm [https://perma.cc/845K-4ET3]. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id.  Amber alerts reach the public through the radio, television, text messages, and 
highway signs.  Id.   
61.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 90.  A neighboring registered sex offender, John 
E. Couey, abducted the nine-year-old girl from Florida, and buried her in his backyard after 
raping and murdering her.  Id.  John E. Couey received the death penalty.  Id.   
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younger.62  Florida was the originating state of the Jessica Lunsford Act,63 
as it was the state where the crime occurred.  Within only a few years, 
however, the Jessica Lunsford Act became a nationwide punishment 
against sex offenders.64  Additionally, the Act implements lifetime 
electronic surveillance subsequent to the offenders’ release, a measure that 
has also been adopted by a number of other states.65 
e. Adam Walsh 
The Adam Walsh Act of 2006 is the most recent and most expansive 
act stemming from crimes against children and was targeted specifically 
at sex offenders.66  This Act was passed on the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the abduction and murder of Adam Walsh, who was kidnapped in Florida 
in 1981 and whose body was found miles away from the abduction site 
weeks later.67  This Federal Act established SORNA,68 a national registry 
of sex offenders; mandatory minimums for certain crimes involving 
minors; a tiered classification system for sex offenders; and voluntary civil 
commitment procedures for states, among other provisions.69  The Adam 
Walsh Act changed the face of sex offender control by eliminating 
interstate confusion and establishing a strict, comprehensive system of 
managing sex offenders in the community.70 
2. The “Stranger Danger” Misconception 
Unfortunately these laws were mostly aimed at sex offenders who 
were strangers to their victims, implying strangers as the ones whom 
 
62.  S. 6389, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006).  Washington passed a Bill that went 
into effect in 2006 in response to Florida’s Jessica Lunsford Act.  The Bill’s amendments 
included that “an offender convicted of the crime of rape of a child in the first degree or child 
molestation in the first degree shall be sentenced to a minimum term of total confinement not 
less than twenty-five years.”  Id.  In 2006, Kansas enacted mandatory minimums of twenty-five 
years for sex offenses involving children and set provisions for electronic monitoring.  H.R. 
2576, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006).  Although Jessica Lunsford’s name was not specifically 
used in the Bill, the similarities in content are evidence that the recent Florida Act propagated 
the Kansas Act.  Id. 
63.  FLA. STAT. § 948.30 (2015). 
64.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 90. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109-248, 120 
Stat. 587 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).  
67.  Id.  
68.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
69.  Adam Walsh Act § 111(1)-(4). 
70.  See SORNA, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: SMART, http://
www.smart.gov/sorna.htm [https://perma.cc/3MRK-AJY8]. 
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children need to be protected from.71  This, however, is false, as roughly 
seventy-percent of child victims are abused by a someone known to 
them.72  Stranger danger stories are more widely publicized because they 
are more sensational, thereby catching the reader’s attention.73  
Unsurprisingly, since these laws have the wrong focus—a stranger as the 
perpetrator instead of a family member—they are not as effective as they 
could be in decreasing sexual crimes.74 
For example, the Wetterling Act has language that specifically 
defines a “predator” as a stranger.75  Incest offenders are specifically 
excluded from the Adam Walsh Act,76 which has drawn criticism, since 
stranger offenders are the only offenders applicable to the statute and they 
constitute the smallest percentage of offenders.77  The public will continue 
to hold incorrect beliefs about sex offenders as long as legislatures create 
laws based on exaggerated public fear rather than reality.  The acts sex 
 
71.  Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(E) (1994).  The Wetterling Act specifically 
defines predatory act as “an act directed at a stranger, or a person with whom a relationship has 
been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.”  Id. 
72.  MYTHS & FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS, CENT. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT. 1 
(Aug. 2000), http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts html [https://perma.cc/V2HW-FP3N].  
“Approximately 60% of boys and 80% of girls who are sexually victimized are abused by 
someone known to the child or the child’s family.”  Id.  The perpetrators are more often than 
not people who the child knows as being in authoritative roles, such as older relatives or 
caretakers.  Id. 
73.  JENNY KITZINGER, FRAMING ABUSE: MEDIA INFLUENCE AND PUBLIC 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 128 (2004). 
74.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 84.  “[T]he public has overwhelmingly 
supported laws that do not work to protect women and children from the types of sexual offenses 
by which they are most likely to be victimized.”  Id.  Interestingly, one of the developments that 
does not characterize strangers as the target perpetrators has a high efficacy rate: the AMBER 
alert system.  NAT’L CENT. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ANALYSIS OF AMBER 
ALERT CASES IN 2011 128  (2012).  “Of the 158 AMBER Alerts issued from January 1, 2011, 
to December 31, 2011, 144 cases resulted in a recovery, 28 of which were successfully 
recovered as a direct result of those respective AMBER Alerts being issued.”  Id. at 8. 
75.  Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(E)(1996).  This Act is “directed at a 
stranger, or a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary 
purpose of victimization.”  Id. 
76.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 92.  Including incest offenders on the registry 
could have adverse effects on the victim.  Id.  For example, if a man is included in the registry 
and the offense listed is an incest offense, then the community will know that a family member 
is the victim.  Victims’ information is not part of the community notification laws and needs to 
be protected by law enforcement.  Id. 
77.  Id. at 92.  “[A]s of 2004, only 18 percent of tier 2 and 3 offenders in New Jersey who 
were eligible for inclusion in the online database were actually included because of appeals and 
exemptions.”  Id.  The Adam Walsh Act establishes an in-depth categorization of the tier system, 
but essentially sex offenders in the registry are ranked according to their level of dangerousness 
and categorized as tier 1, tier 2, or tier 3, with tier 3 being the most dangerous.  Adam Walsh 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §16901 (2006).  This 18 percent statistic is important because it shows that the 
laws are not able to be as effective as they were designed to be because they are not being based 
on the realities of sex offenses, namely that strangers are not likely to be the perpetrators.  
ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 92.   
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offenders commit already stigmatize them; however, the current “war” on 
sex offenders intensifies and prolongs the already existent stigma.78 
When the average person hears the label sex offender, he or she 
imagines those offenders who are on one extreme of the spectrum, usually 
those who commit violent sex crimes against children.79  However, “[t]he 
typical registered sex offender is a less freakish figure than the official 
narrative suggests.”80  Child molesters make up a very small percentage 
of sex offenders, and yet that small population is the connotation for the 
term “sex offender” in the mind of society. 
B. Creating Sexually Violent Predator Acts 
The purpose behind creating Sexually Violent Predator Acts ( 
“SVPAs”) was to prevent newly released sex offenders from committing 
the same crimes for which they were imprisoned in the first place.81  The 
inherent assumption in that purpose is that sex offenders have a high risk 
of recidivism, which is not true.82  A study by the Department of Justice 
found that only 5.3% of released sex offenders were arrested again for 
another sex crime within the next three years.83  Another study by Human 
Rights Watch found that only a very small percentage of registered sex 
offenders ever committed a second offense.84  Furthermore, there are no 
reliable tests for determining the likelihood of recidivism.85 
 
78.  Yung, supra note 44, at 447.  There has also been termed a “war on sex offenders,” 
likening the stark increase in sex offense laws and their publicity to a criminal war, playing off 
of the moral panic that they promote.  Id.  Criminal wars are typified by three stages: 
“marshalling of resources, myth creation, and exception making.”  Id. at 440.  Examples of 
criminal wars include the “War on Drugs,” the “War on Terror,” and the “War on Poverty.”  Id. 
79.  John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The Monstrous Other Within, 53 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 31, 40 (2008).  When a Florida school district sent home a letter with their students 
informing parents that a known sexual predator moved into the area, one parent stated that “I 
don’t know the circumstances of this gentleman . . . but I took advantage of this to review some 
‘Stranger Danger’ tips with my kids.”  Jose Lambiet, Parents Warned About Sexual Predators, 
SUNSENTINEL (Feb. 10, 1997), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1997-02-
10/news/9702090255_1_sexual-predator-middle-school-girls-letters [https://perma.cc/P8MG-
5VB3] (one example of the public making assumptions without the relevant information). 
80.  Douard, supra note 79; LANCASTER, supra note 9, at 79. 
81.  Melissa Wangenheim, Note, ‘To Catch a Predator,’ Are We Casting Our Nets Too 
Far?: Constitutional Concerns Regarding the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 62 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 559, 572 (2010). 
82.  LANCASTER, supra note 9, at 78. 
83.  Id. (citing Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt & Matthew R. Durose, Recidivism of 
Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1 
(2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3F7-UVH7]). 
84.  NO EASY ANSWERS, supra note 51, at 48.  98% of 500 sample registrants on the 
North Carolina sex offender registry had only committed that original offense.  Id.  
85.  Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders, 44 CONN. L. 
REV. 161, 193 (2011).  The variation in sex offense characteristics and motivations causes 
uncertainty in assessing the level of risk for a particular offender.  Risk Assessment, ASS’N FOR 
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SVPAs resolved the public fear of sex offenders living unrestrained 
in society.  Under these acts, the state and federal governments are 
authorized to imprison sex offenders who meet certain criteria either in 
place of or subsequent to serving their prison sentence.86  Prosecutors must 
show an offender qualifies with a specified prerequisite offense and a 
mental disorder that makes him more likely to reoffend.87  Although these 
Acts have withstood constitutional challenges,88 they present a host of 
constitutional concerns, including ex post facto, double jeopardy, and 
indeterminate detention.89 
The state of Washington enacted the first SVPA in 199090 in response 
to Earl Shriner’s rape and mutilation of a seven-year-old boy after Shriner 
was released from prison for kidnapping and raping two teenage girls.91  
In order to be civilly committed, Washington’s SVPA requires a 
prosecutor to prove that an offender is a “sexually violent predator,” 
defined as someone who has been “convicted of or charged with a crime 
of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder which makes him likely to engage in predatory acts 
of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.”92  To reiterate, a 
prosecutor needs to prove that the offender has: “(1) a prior conviction for 
a sexually violent offense; and, (2) a mental disorder or disability (3) 
causing the individual significant difficulty in controlling recidivist 
behavior.”93  Other states quickly followed Washington’s lead by enacting 
their own laws that were similar in nature, which also require a finding of 
those three elements.94 
In 2006, the federal government began enacting sexually violent 
predator laws, an authority that, until then, was left to individual states.95  
Now, offenders in federal custody could be subject to civil commitment.96  
 
THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, http://www.atsa.com/risk-assessment 
[https://perma.cc/V93C-B64A]. 
86.  Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 560. 
87.  Hamilton, supra note 14.  The specific statutes for commitment vary between 
jurisdictions.  Id. 
88.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).  
89.  See infra Part II.B.  Id. at 351; Hamilton, supra note 14 (“Those who are committed 
are rarely ever released.”).  
90.  WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.10–71.09.902 (2014).  
91.  John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental Abnormality,” 
and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volitional vs. Emotional Abnormality and the Debate Between 
Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1367, 1373–74 n.25 (2003) 
[hereinafter Fabien, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond]. 
92.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (2014). 
93.  Hamilton, supra note 14. 
94.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–3717 (2014); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803–
3811 (2001); IOWA CODE §§ 229A.1–229.A.16 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 253B.185 (2014). 
95.  18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006).  
96.  Id. 
2017] THE CAGE A FETISH CAN BUILD 155 
Not only did this enactment make it possible to include more offenders 
because of the additional federal offenders, but also the definitions for 
who qualified as a sexually violent predator were expanded.97  In order to 
commit an individual under the federal act, the government only needs to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual committed a 
“sexually violent offense or child molestation.”98  Notably absent from the 
requirements is a prerequisite criminal conviction under a reasonable 
doubt standard.  Now, offenders can be classified as a sexually dangerous 
person without committing a sex offense at all, violent or nonviolent, even 
though targeting violent offenses was the original goal of SVPAs.99  In 
fact, approximately 20% of federally committed individuals were only 
committed with a finding of clear and convincing evidence of a sex 
offense.100  Sex offender legislation is becoming more encompassing at 
every stage of development and the consequence is that more and more 
offenders are at risk of civil commitment. 
The Sexually Violent Predator requirements are broad because the 
state and federal legislatures’ goals were to keep sex offenders off the 
street and away from the community.  After an offender has been 
identified as a potential violent predator based on a prerequisite offense, 
the offender is evaluated by a mental health professional and given a 
hearing at which the prosecutor must prove the offender meets the 
qualifications to be committed under the respective sexually violent 
predator statutes.101 
1. Prerequisite Offense Requirement 
Committing a prerequisite offense is the first step in being considered 
for commitment under a SVPA, although determining which offenses 
meet the requirement is not always clear.  Since each state’s SVPA 
contains slight variations from each other, the offenses needed to satisfy 
the first element are also slightly different and involve varying degrees of 
judicial discretion.  A few states specifically enumerate which offenses 
qualify without much ambiguity, these states involve the least amount of 
judicial discretion.102  Vagueness is introduced, however, in the final 
 
97.  Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 575. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh Act Lowered the 
Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 391, 
408–09 (2011).   
101.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03–29a07 (2013). 
102.  MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(4) (2010 & Supp. 2014).  “Sexually violent offense” is 
defined as:  
Felonies of rape in the first degree, forcible rape, rape, statutory rape in the first 
degree, sodomy in the first degree, forcible sodomy, sodomy, statutory sodomy in the 
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provision, which allows for the inclusion of offenses that bear similarities 
to the enumerated offenses.103  Judicial discretion is needed, therefore, to 
interpret the description “any felony offense that contains elements 
substantially similar to the offenses listed above” is interpreted.104 
Next are the states that use a more discretionary construction in 
defining which offenses qualify as a predicate offense.105  The relevant 
portion of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act adds ”any offense 
which either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently 
during civil commitment proceedings pursuant to this act, has been 
determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated” 
after its list of particular offenses.106 
Finally, New Jersey and South Carolina sit on the extreme end of the 
discretionary spectrum, conferring to the judge complete discretion as to 
what offenses can be deemed sexually violent, and therefore, satisfy, the 
statute.107  Under statutes with this construction, there is no boundary to 
safeguard which offenders immediately satisfy the first prong.108  Wide 
discretion over the determination of prerequisite offenses, coupled with 
the vague description of “mental abnormality,” raises the concern of 
whether offenders’ liberty interests are being adequately protected; 
namely, they are not. 
 
first degree, or an attempt to commit any of the preceding crimes, or child molestation 
in the first, second, third, or fourth degree, sexual abuse, sexual abuse in the first 
degree, rape in the second degree, sexual assault, sexual assault in the first degree, 
sodomy in the second degree, deviate sexual assault, deviate sexual assault in the first 
degree, or the act of abuse of a child involving either sexual contact, a prohibited 
sexual act, sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation of a minor, or any felony offense that 
contains elements substantially similar to the offenses listed above. 
Id.; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 
(2008).  
103.  MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(4). 
104.  Id. 
105.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e) (2013). 
106.  Id. at § 59-29a02(e)(13). 
107.  N.J. STAT. § 30:4-27.26 (2008). 
(a) aggravated sexual assault; sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual contact; 
kidnapping pursuant to subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2) of subsection c. of 
N.J.S.2C:13-1; criminal sexual contact; felony murder pursuant to paragraph (3) of 
N.J.S.2C:11-3 if the underlying crime is sexual assault; an attempt to commit any of 
these enumerated offenses; or a criminal offense with substantially the same elements 
as any offense enumerated above, entered or imposed under the laws of the United 
States, this State or another state; or 
(b) any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based 
on the circumstances of the case, the person’s offense  
should be considered a sexually violent offense. 
Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(2)(o) (2015). 
108.  Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 584. 
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2. Mental Abnormality Requirement 
Sex offender civil commitment procedures use general, i.e. for 
reasons other than sex offenses, civil commitment as guidelines, but 
provide less constitutional protection because of a lack of specificity.  To 
commit a defendant to an institution instead of prison, there must be a 
showing that “the person sought to be committed is mentally ill . . . [and] 
the person requires hospitalization for his or her own safety and for the 
protection of others.”109  As soon as the mental illness is no longer present, 
the person must be released, regardless of how dangerous he continues to 
be.110  The crucial disparity between general civil commitments and their 
sex offender counterparts is that while general commitments require a 
mental illness, sex offender commitments only require a mental 
abnormality.111  
a. “Diagnosing” a mental abnormality 
Mental abnormality, as it relates to SVPAs, is defined as a 
“congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional 
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses 
in a degree constituting such a person a menace to the health and safety of 
others.”112  The law relies on psychiatry’s ever-broadening categorization 
of mental disorders in its requirement of “mental abnormality.”113  The 
most common qualifying mental abnormalities are mood disorders, 
personality disorders, and paraphilias.114  With the expansive list of 
disorders available, the law is essentially able to cherry pick a “disorder” 
to apply when it is deemed to be in the public interest.115  It has been 
proposed that courts may purposefully decline to define disorders that 
qualify under the statute in order for it to be applicable in as many 
circumstances as possible.116  This is yet further evidence of the increased 
stigma placed on sex offenders. 
b. Implication of socially taboo, but not dangerous, sexual interests 
When the Supreme Court ruled the term “mental abnormality” was 
not unconstitutionally vague,117 it “open[ed] the door to the acceptance of 
 
109.  Fabien, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond, supra note 91, at 1376. 
110.  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 74 (1992). 
111.  Id.; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997).  
112.  KAN. STAT. ANN §59-29a02(b) (2012). 
113.  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 546. 
114.  Fabien, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond, supra note 91, at 1379.   
115.  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 546; Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: 
Transsubstantive Behavior and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 114 (2008).  
116.  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 552. 
117.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997). 
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other paraphilias as qualifying diagnoses.”118  Paraphilias, or abnormal 
sexual interests, are a point of contention between the medical and legal 
field.119  Paraphilias are defined as “any intense and persistent sexual 
interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulation or preparatory 
fondling with phenotypically normal, physically mature, consenting 
human partners.”120  Critics view the mental abnormality requirement as 
far-reaching because paraphilias are only included on the basis of societal 
taboo, not because they are an actual disease of the mind.121  In fact, 
abnormal sexual interests are not always dangerous, nor do they 
necessarily pose risks to society, and the law generally only addresses 
them when they are coupled with a crime.122  Divergent sexual interests 
that would qualify as a paraphilia in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders123 are not as anomalous in society as one might think.  
A survey of men aged forty to seventy-nine found “sixty-two percent 
reported some degree of sexual arousal from at least one paraphilia-related 
stimulus while forty-four percent had engaged in at least one paraphilia-
related sexual behavior.”124 
The inclusion of paraphilias based more strongly on societal than 
medical reasons carries legal implications, since the law takes its cue from 
the medical categorization.125  The largest category of mental abnormality 
relied on to commit offenders is an unspecified paraphilic disorder, 
meaning that their diagnosis resembles paraphilias but doesn’t match a 
 
118.  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 553. 
119.  First, supra note 22, at 191. 
120.  DSM-5, supra note 22, at 685.  Most diagnoses fall under the “Other Specific 
Paraphilic Disorder” or “Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder” category; however, eight of the most 
common paraphilias include: 
voyeuristic disorder (spying on others in private activities), exhibitionistic disorder 
(exposing the genitals), frotteuristic disorder (touching or rubbing against a 
nonconsenting individual), sexual masochism disorder (undergoing humiliation, 
bondage, or suffering), sexual sadism disorder (inflicting humiliation, bondage, or 
suffering), pedophilic disorder (sexual focus on children), fetishistic disorder (using 
nonliving objects or having a highly specific focus on nongenital body parts), and 
transvestic disorder (engaging in sexually arousing cross-dressing). 
Id. 
121.  Erickson, supra note 115, at 114.  
122.  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 560. 
123.  DSM-5, supra note 22, at xli.  The DSM is a comprehensive list of all mental 
disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association to aid clinicians in classifying and 
treating patients.  Id.; John Matthew Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators: The Ethical 
Application of Psychiatric Diagnoses in Partisan Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment 
Proceedings, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 82, 83 (2011) (“The classification of a syndrome 
as a mental disorder in the [DSM-V] must be regarded as the primary standard for medical 
validity.”).  
124.  Christopher Joseph Ahlers et al., How Unusual are the Contents of Paraphilias? 
Paraphilia-Associated Sexual Arousal Patterns in a Community-Based Sample of Men, 8 J. 
SEXUAL MED. 1362, 1366–69 (2011).  
125.  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 555. 
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listed category.126  The civil commitment laws operate on a slippery slope 
by satisfying the mental disease element with a paraphilia or unspecified 
paraphilic diagnosis as they do not convey much information on the future 
dangerousness of the offender.127 
3. Commitment Models 
Although the language of each state’s act is largely the same, there 
are slight differences.128  For example, Illinois and Minnesota solve the 
double jeopardy and ex post facto concerns by having a sexually violent 
predator hearing before beginning the offender’s prison sentence for the 
purpose of either sending the offender to prison or having him civilly 
committed if he qualifies as a sexually violent predator.129  Although this 
does not resolve the issue of indefinite commitment terms, it does ensure 
offenders are not punished twice.  This model of commitment implies the 
legislature acknowledges civil commitment as akin to punishment. 
The post-prison commitment model,130 represented in Washington 
and the majority of states’ acts, present more constitutional challenges 
than the Illinois model does because it duplicates the effects of previous 
prison punishment, despite the Supreme Court ruling on the issue.131  In 
Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court held the Kansas Sexually Violent 
Predator Act was not unconstitutional in regard to double jeopardy and ex 
post facto protections.132  If Hendricks had been committed prior to 
serving his prison sentence, the state would not be required to release him 
from commitment after a period equal to the prison sentence, but instead 
could hold him for any period that he continues to suffer from a mental 
abnormality that poses a threat to the public.133  Likewise, the Court 
reasoned that a state can commit an offender after completion of a prison 
sentence if he meets the qualifications, because he would have had no right 
to be released even if committed initially.134 
 
126.  Id. at 554.  The category is applied when “the clinician chooses not to specify the 
reason that the criteria are not met for a specific paraphilic disorder, and includes presentations 
in which there is insufficient information to make a more specific diagnosis.”  DSM-5, supra 
note 22, at 705 (emphasis added). 
127.  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 555. 
128.  Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 571. 
129.  725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 205/0.01–205/12 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 253B.185 
(2014).  See infra Part II.B.  
130.  Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 572.  The post-prison model of civil commitment 
adjudicates the offender as a Sexually Violent Predator after having served a prison sentence 
for the same prerequisite crime.  Six to twelve months before release from prison a prosecutor 
can move for a probable cause hearing to begin the process of commitment.  Id.  
131.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997). 
132.  Id. at 369–70. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
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If “mental abnormality” was not vague enough, under SVPAs, the 
abnormality must also render it “difficult for the person to control his 
behavior.”135  The Court uses this qualification to justify the future 
dangerousness component usually necessary to restrain a person.136  The 
Supreme Court held that there only needs to be “serious difficulty” in 
controlling behavior and not a higher standard of a complete lack of 
control as a subsequent ruling in Kansas v. Crane contends.137  The more 
SVPAs come under litigation, the more broadly the Court defines the 
standard.138 
II. RIGHTS AFFORDED TO THE COMMITTED 
The Due Process Clause protects the liberty interests of individuals 
as a fundamental right, one that cannot be easily taken away.139  However, 
civil commitment are constitutionally permissible because the Supreme 
Court has ruled their potential dangerousness coupled with a lack of 
behavioral control is so great as to warrant that loss of liberty.140  The key 
component to this exception is the “mental illness” or “mental 
abnormality” requirement.141  Mental abnormality, and its effect on an 
offender’s ability to control his behavior, is what legislatures use to 
separate sexually violent predators from “typical recidivists.”142 
The Supreme Court ruled that the civilly committed only hold 
constitutionally protected rights to “conditions of reasonable care and 
safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such 
training as may be required by these interests.”143  Additionally, the right 
to treatment is clarified by adding that the Court “[has] never held that the 
Constitution prevents a state from civilly detaining those for whom no 
treatment is available.”144  Without a Supreme Court ruling, individual 
 
135.  Id. at 358. 
136.  Id. at 351. 
137.  Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 346, 413 (2002).  
138.  Id. (holding that there does not need to be complete lack of control, only serious 
difficulty); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351 (holding that mental abnormality satisfies the mental 
illness requirement although it is not a term used in the medical field). 
139.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”). 
140.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 
141.  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 74 (1992); Crane, 534 U.S. at 413. 
142.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (“[T]he nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity 
of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender 
whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from 
the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”). 
143.  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).  
144.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366. 
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states are left to determine what services should be provided, resulting in 
inconsistencies and lack of services.145  This section will first discuss 
inconsistencies and lack of services between states, and next will highlight 
the low rate of release that has the practical consequence of transforming 
the constitutional indefinite detention into lifetime detention.146  And this 
indefinite detention has survived constitutional challenges because it is 
not governed with the protections afforded to criminal procedures, such 
as double jeopardy, ex post facto, and due process.147 
A. No Constitutional Right to Treatment 
Inconsistencies in treatment state-by-state exist because the Supreme 
Court established that those committed have no rights to receive 
treatment, and the authority is left to the individual states to choose 
whether to they wish to provide any treatment.148  Sexually violent 
predators experience a starkly different type of civil commitment 
depending on whether they are committed in Washington or in 
Minnesota.149  The Washington and Minnesota statutes have withheld 
challenges to their respective civil commitment provisions, 
notwithstanding the statutes’ drastically different standards with regard to 
an offender’s right to receive treatment while committed, with all other 
jurisdictions following treatment standards somewhere in between.150  
Commitment standards in the Ninth Circuit, which includes Washington, 
require treatment that will provide the offender with a “realistic 
opportunity to be cured and released.”151  In contrast, the treatment 
provided by facilities in the Eighth Circuit, including Minnesota, merely 
have to refrain from being “so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the 
conscience.”152 
1. Shocks the Conscience Standard 
The Eighth Circuit has not expanded the Supreme Court’s 
requirements; it has held that those committed do not have “a broader due 
 
145.  Annual Survey of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs 2014, SEX OFFENDER 
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS NETWORK (Oct. 27, 2014).  In a study of seventeen of the 
states with civil commitment programs, the levels of participation in treatment programs ranged 
from thirty-percent to one-hundred percent.  Id. 
146.  Hamilton, supra note 14, at 552.  The specific statutes for commitment vary between 
jurisdictions.  Id.  
147.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371. 
148.  Id. at 366. 
149.  Compare Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2012), with Sharp v. 
Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).  
150.  Strutton, 668 F.3d at 554; Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172.   
151.  Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172.   
152.  Strutton, 668 F.3d at 554. 
162 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:141 
process right to appropriate or effective or reasonable treatment of the 
illness or disability that triggered the patient’s involuntary 
confinement.”153  Facilities in the Eighth Circuit will release a patient 
when they no longer have a mental abnormality or pose a danger to the 
public;154 however, without the existence of rehabilitative services or the 
requirement that detainees participate, the provision of release may be 
meaningless. 
The Eighth Circuit has evaluated due process claims under a “shocks 
the conscience” test.155  When a civilly committed person asserts he has 
not been provided with adequate mental health services, he must show 
“the inadequacies in the treatment [he] received were so arbitrary or 
egregious as to shock the conscience.”156  The Court even admitted that 
although the “temporary elimination of psychoeducational courses . . . fell 
below an acceptable professional standard,” it did not defeat the test and 
therefore the claim was denied.157  Unfortunately, even if the Court 
applied the “professional judgment” standard used by other jurisdictions, 
the result in Strutton may have remained the same.158 
2. Professional Judgment Standard 
The Supreme Court applies the professional judgment standard, 
which is an alternative standard for determining what treatment is owed 
to the offenders.159  This preferred standard “presumes that the treatment 
decisions of a qualified mental health professional are valid unless they 
substantially depart from generally accepted norms.”160  Courts apply this 
standard by analyzing the treatment a facility provides: if the treatment 
resembles what is commonly acceptable in the field, then it passes the test 
and the courts will not get involved with the choices of the facility.161  
Problems currently arise from the application of the professional judgment 
standard, however, because there is no generally accepted treatment in the 
field for sexually violent predators.162  Some professionals have posited 
 
153.  Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 788 (8th Cir. 2006). 
154.  MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495(2) (2010 & Supp. 2014).  Under the Missouri statute, a 
sexually violent predator can be committed “for control, care, and treatment until such time as 
[his] mental abnormality has so changed that [he] is safe to be at large.”  Id. 
155.  Strutton, 668 F.3d at 554.  
156.  Id. at 554 (holding lack of psychoeducational treatment did not violate the rights of 
someone involuntarily committed for child molestation).   
157.  Id. at 554–55. 
158.  Nordsieck, supra note 30, at 1284. 
159.  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982). 
160.  Nordsieck, supra note 30, at 1284.  The only qualifications for making the decisions 
of treatment are that the decision-maker is “competent, whether by education, training or 
experience, to make the particular decision at issue.”  Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 n.30. 
161.  Nordsieck, supra note 30, at 1298. 
162.  Id. 
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that sex offenders may not be treatable at all, since, as of now, there is no 
scientific evidence showing any specific treatment plan can be 
effective.163  The Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers itself 
provides unclear advice on how to rehabilitate sex offenders.164  The 
Association proffers treatment suggestions, but at the same time caveats 
those suggestions by advising professionals to depart from the suggestions 
as they see fit.165  If the standard of care states a professional can depart 
from common treatments when they determine it to be appropriate, then 
the standard becomes wholly based on whatever approach a professional 
decides, without any regard to the rest of the field. 
The Ninth Circuit also uses the professional judgment standard, but 
accompanies it with a judicial scrutiny provision.166  This Note will refer 
to the Ninth Circuit’s variation on the professional judgment standard as 
the “professional judgment plus” standard.  The Ninth Circuit criticized 
the professional judgment standard because it allowed administrators of 
each facility too much latitude in the individual decision-making 
procedures.167  In response to the defendants’ appellate claim that the 
lower court should have deferred to the clinical director’s professional 
judgment, the court warned that if they were to overrule the lower court’s 
decision, the “[c]onditions of confinement would be above judicial 
scrutiny and would depend on who happened to be in charge of a particular 
program.”168  For example, in Sharp, when there were no clinical directors 
with specialized sex offender experience, the court did not rule that 
general mental health professional decisions qualified under the 
standard.169  The court made an important distinction here that narrows the 
scope of acceptable treatment. 
Commitment centers in the Ninth Circuit must “provide civilly-
committed persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them 
a realistic opportunity to be cured and released.”170  The professional 
judgment plus standard is in contrast to the standards of the Eighth Circuit 
because it seems to be aimed at rehabilitation, rather than an indefinite 
 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Research, THE ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, 
http://www.atsa.com/research [https://perma.cc/2TH9-27UG] (“ATSA encourages those 
involved in addressing the problem of sexual offending to adopt practices consistent with the 
best available evidence, and to change their practices as new evidence becomes available.”).   
166.  Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000).   
167.  Id. at 1171.  In previous court rulings, the Washington Special Commitment Center 
was under an injunction to put specific treatment programs in place after the court found the 
conditions of confinement were not unconstitutional.  Id. 
168.  Id. at 1169. 
169.  Id. at 1171. 
170.  Id. at 1172. 
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sentence with the empty promise of being released.171  While this standard 
identifies the state’s obligation to provide an avenue for release if the state 
chooses to commit, its goal is nevertheless hindered by the obstacle of 
limited knowledge of the root cause. 
B. Absence of Criminal Protections in Civil Commitment Proceedings 
The Supreme Court ruled that there are no double jeopardy, ex post 
facto, or Fifth Amendment protections during civil commitment 
procedures due to its civil versus criminal designation.172  Criminal 
enforcement is punitive in nature whereas civil enforcement is not.  The 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that an 
individual cannot be charged twice for the same offense.173  There is no 
double jeopardy issue present in civil commitment hearings because the 
offender is technically not being charged twice for the same crime, as civil 
commitment does not qualify as criminal punishment.174  Another 
constitutional protection, ex post facto, broadly refers to the concept of 
retroactivity, specifically, whether new laws have the ability to change the 
penalties for a certain offense after they are committed.175  Furthermore, 
individuals who committed a sex offense prior to the establishment of an 
SVPA are also subject to civil commitment because the statute is civil and 
therefore not imposing a new criminal punishment after the fact.176  “[T]he 
Court essentially paved the way for the commitment of sexually violent 
predators both in lieu of and subsequent to completions of a criminal 
sentence.”177 
In Allen v. Illinois, the Court stated that Allen did not have a Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination during the sexually 
violent predator hearing because it was not a criminal proceeding.178  A 
potential predator is required by the court to submit to psychological 
evaluations where they may reveal incriminating statements that can be 
 
171.  Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that there were no 
violations in treatment procedures when procedures did not meet field standards).  
172.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 
(1986); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (holding there was no double jeopardy issue 
when Baxstrom already served prison sentence for same crime when he was committed); see 
also Eli M. Rollman, “Mental Illness”: A Sexually Violent Predator Is Punished Twice For One 
Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (1998). 
173.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”).  
174.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.  
175.  See Evan C. Zoldan, The Civil Ex Post Facto Clause, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 727, 730 
(2015). 
176.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.   
177.  Deborah L Morris, Constitutional Implications of the Involuntary Commitment of 
Sexually Violent Predators—A Due Process Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 601 (1997).  
178.  Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986). 
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used in court.  Allen was awarded a right to counsel during the proceeding; 
however, allowing the “right to counsel,” which is a characteristic right of 
a criminal proceeding, did not mean that he was afforded other 
constitutional rights inherent in criminal proceedings.179  The dissent in 
Allen held the proceedings should be considered criminal because they 
involve a loss of liberty and bear procedural similarities to criminal 
proceedings, and, therefore, Allen also should be awarded additional 
constitutional protections.180 
Justice Breyer commented in the Hendricks dissent that the civil 
commitment scheme cannot be deemed civil merely by placing the word 
“civil” in the statute, and instead needs to be analyzed according to its 
practical effect.181  If those committed are not receiving effective 
treatment for their purported mental defects, then their detainment seems 
more akin to punishment and should be scrutinized as such.  By removing 
the guise of rehabilitation, the proposed reasoning for committing this 
class of sex offenders is diminished and the serious implications of pure 
incapacitation should be re-evaluated.182 
III. COMMUNITY RESTRICTIONS WOULD SERVE THE STATE’S INTEREST 
IN PROTECTING THE PUBLIC 
To address these constitutional concerns surrounding civil 
commitment, offenders should be placed under supervised release instead 
of in commitment facilities.  Although offenders would continue to be 
heavily monitored in the community, they would not be confined.  Rather 
than persisting in the expensive, constitutionally dubious civil 
commitment regime, states should rely on the already existing supervisory 
structures created.  The Adam Walsh Act created a comprehensive system 
of sex offender management with strict and specific provisions that, in 
 
179.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that pretrial detention 
for dangerousness does not violate Fifth Amendment due process rights).  The standard for 
dangerousness applied in Salerno was that “no condition or combination of conditions of release 
[would] ensure the safety of . . . the community.”  Id. 
180.  Allen, 478 U.S. at 376–84.  The dissent noted that the Sexually Violent Predator 
hearings only came into effect because of the crime Allen previously committed, and that the 
hearings would not have taken place if he had not committed the crime.  Id. at 379.  The 
requirement of a crime and the criminal nature of the proceedings, including confining someone 
based on a criminal behavior, should qualify SVP statutes as criminal.  Id. 
181.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 381.  Justice Breyer concurred with the majority’s 
determination that the “mental abnormality” language of the statute did not violate the Due 
Process Clause, but dissented in the opinion because without access to treatment, the statute was 
punitive in nature.  Id. at 373.   
182.  See Edward P. Ra, The Civil Confinement of Sexual Predators: A Delicate Balance, 
22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 335, 350 (2007) (“States thus must prove their civil intent 
in order to defeat challenges rooted in the constitutional protections implicated by criminal 
processes and punishments.”). 
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addition to individual state community supervision structures, provide 
assurance that the public will be protected.183  The government would also 
see a cost benefit from changing methods of supervision since the 
financial burden of civil commitment is so heavy.184  The solution this 
Note proposes will address the financial criticisms of civil commitment in 
addition to offenders’ constitutional rights to liberty.185  These methods, 
while still costly, would reduce the expenditure for sex offender 
supervision, serve the government’s goals in protecting the public, and 
return some of the constitutionally-mandated liberty back to sex offenders. 
A. SORNA: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) 
created a national registry for sex offenders, categorizing them into tiers 
based on the seriousness of the offense.186  Any person convicted of a sex 
offense must register himself with the database and provide all identifying 
information, updating his profile periodically according to his tier 
group.187  The least dangerous offenders are in Tier I, escalating in 
dangerousness to Tier III, which includes those convicted of “aggravated 
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact against a minor under 
thirteen, or nonparent kidnapping of a minor.”188  Registration as a Tier 
III sex offender is required for life,189 which is most likely where current 
 
183.  Adam Walsh Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006). 
184.  See  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 141.  The cost of housing one offender in 
a civil commitment facility ranges from $17,391 in Texas to $166,000 in California, usually 
depending on what services the facility offers.  Id. 
185.  Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement 
of Adequate Treatment, 49 BOS. C. L. REV. 1383, 1427 (2008).  Critics of civil commitment 
have suggested imposing longer prison sentences on sex offenders as a solution to the concern 
that the government is spending too much money on having sexually violent predators 
“warehoused” in civil commitment facilities.  Id.  The argument is that since offenders are 
neither being treated for their mental abnormality nor being released in any significant number, 
it is not an efficient use of the government’s limited budget.  Id. at 1427.  The average cost per 
year for civilly committing a sexually violent predator is $92,017.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra 
note 42, at 141.  In contrast, the average cost per year to house an offender in prison is $25,994.  
Id.  
186.  Adam Walsh Act, PUB. L. NO. 109–248, § 103, 120 Stat. 587, 587 (2006) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4248).  SORNA sets the minimum amount of information and 
protections that states must adhere to, but the states are permitted to add to the SORNA 
requirements.  SORNA, supra note 70.  The Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, 
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking [hereinafter SMART] was created with the Adam 
Walsh Act to assist states in their implementation of the Act and update the SORNA guidelines 
as needed.  Id.   
187.  Adam Walsh Act, § 113.  Convicted persons must provide basic personal and 
criminal information along with their physical description, Internet identifiers, professional 
licensing information, temporary lodging information if they are not living at their listed 
permanent residence, and vehicle information.  Id. 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. 
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adjudicated sexually violent predators would fall.  Tier III offenders are 
required to update law enforcement every three months with their current 
address and appearance.190 
SORNA created a monitoring system for sex offenders living in the 
community, which this Note contends would also be effective for sexually 
violent predators living in the same communities because of the strict 
nature of the Tier III regulations.  SORNA is retroactive, meaning the 
offenders who were convicted before 2006 also must register.191  The 
retroactivity is crucial to ensuring the intended goal of the statute—to 
protect the public—is carried out, because it will force every sex offender 
to register.192  Because retroactivity makes it possible to reach every sex 
offender, the offenders in civil commitments would be equally and safely 
monitored by SORNA.  The Adam Walsh Act also increased the amount 
of publically available information about the offender.193  States can 
monitor offenders with more confidence now that there is an expansive 
database that includes sex offenders nationwide, and which prevents 
offenders from going unaccounted for.194 
1. Residency Restrictions 
Nearly all states have enacted residency restrictions for sex offenders 
as a means of protecting the public.195  Residency restrictions are also a 
product of the 1990 crackdown on sex offenders, following the theme of 
registration and notification laws.196  A key goal for regulating where sex 
offenders live is to decrease the availability of victims.197  This goal is 
 
190.  Id. 
191.  28 C.F.R. § 72 (2010).  An interim rule was put in place, and subsequently codified, 
to enforce the retroactivity of SORNA since the Adam Walsh Act as enacted did not specifically 
provide for a retroactive application.  72 FED. REG. 8894 (2007); 28 C.F.R. § 72 (2010). 
192.  28 C.F.R. § 72 (2010). 
[T]he interests opposing and supporting registration—any adverse effect or burden of 
SORNA’s requirements on sex offenders weighed against the public safety interests 
furthered by those requirements—are much the same whether the class of sex 
offenders with pre-SORNA convictions or the class of sex offenders with post-
SORNA convictions is considered. 
Id. 
193.  See Registry Requirement FAQs, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: SMART, 
http://www.smart.gov/sorna htm [https://perma.cc/3MRK-AJY8].  The public website for sex 
offenders lists all past sex offenses, their employer’s address, their school address, all aliases, 
current photos, a physical description, their permanent and habitual addresses, and vehicle 
identifying information.  Id.  
194.  Wright, supra note 36.   
195.  Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on 
Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 122 (2007) [hereinafter Yung, Banishment by a 
Thousand Laws].  There are numerous problems and critiques of sex offender residency 
restrictions, but these are outside the scope of this Note.  
196.  Id. at 121. 
197.  Id. at 154. 
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accomplished by setting mandatory living distances from child-related 
sites, for example, schools, playgrounds, and child care centers.198  In 
essence, sex offenders are banned from potential child contact.  In states 
that have not mandated any state-wide restrictions, some localities have 
established their own residency restrictions.199 
Treatment and other rehabilitative services may be more difficult to 
access due to the community priority of residency restrictions.200  
Residency restrictions result in “hotbeds” of sex offenders living in certain 
areas of cities because they are the only part of the city that successfully 
evades all exclusion zones.201  Critics of residency restrictions stress the 
problems with this approach, since it reinforces the sex offender stigma 
without providing a long-term solution.202  Forced to live in remote areas 
with like-minded individuals, offenders do not have access to treatment or 
other resources.203  There is a valid concern that the restrictions placed on 
sex offenders in the community are too inhibitory and further limit access 
to treatment because individuals’ liberties are being taken away without 
any benefit.204  However, at the same time, this critique exemplifies the 
fact that sex offenders in the community are still heavily monitored and 
the public’s interest in protecting children is still being met, while giving 
more liberty to offenders than is given in civil commitments.  Offenders’ 
access to treatment in the community is hindered by their living 
constraints, and their access to treatment in commitments is likewise 
hindered by their lack of a statutory right to receive it, both of which are 
irrelevant since there are no effective treatments.205  Nonetheless, if 
offenders are not receiving treatment in either setting and the public’s 
interest in safety is being served by residency restrictions, then there is no 
benefit in committing offenders who could live in the community.  
Therefore, diverting offenders from commitments and into community 
supervision would more aptly balance the two interests at stake. 
2. Internet and Computer Restrictions 
The growing use of technology, and specifically the Internet, has 
opened the door for new types of crimes to be committed by sex offenders, 
 
198.  See generally FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2015); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2014); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-11(c) (2015); IOWA CODE § 
692A.2A (2014). 
199.  Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws, supra note 195, at 125. 
200.  Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: Liberty, Protectionism, Justice, 
and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1411 (2009). 
201.  Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws, supra note 195, at 139–40. 
202.  Id. at 141. 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. 
205.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
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and consequently, increased types of restrictions.  Internet and computer 
restrictions for released sex offenders have been used to monitor those 
convicted of sex crimes related to the Internet, such as child 
pornography.206  Federal and state laws restrict offenders in varying 
degrees: some offenders are not allowed to even own a personal computer, 
while others are only restricted from accessing certain websites.207  Many 
jurisdictions allow the use of these types of restrictions because there is a 
substantial and justifiable relationship between the government interest 
that is being protected and the restriction (i.e. limited internet or computer 
use) employed.208 
The state must balance the interests of the released offender with the 
interests of the government.209  Courts are cautious to impose computer 
restrictions, since they acknowledge computer and Internet access has 
become a fundamental aspect of life in current society, and therefore, a 
protected liberty.210  However, when someone is on supervised release, 
there is a “diminished expectation of privacy,” and consequently, 
liberty.211  The government cannot deprive released offenders of their 
liberty in using the Internet if the deprivation does not relate to protecting 
the public, namely, if the offense has little to do with the Internet.  Rather, 
the restriction must be “reasonably related” to the governmental interest 
being furthered.212 
Internet restrictions for those offenders who are now placed in civil 
commitments would be an effective means of monitoring them while, at 
the same time, increasing liberty in a way that better balances the 
competing interests of the state and the offender.  The state’s interest in 
protecting the public would be served because courts will impose 
restrictions that are “narrowly tailored and directly related to the social 
policies of deterring [the released offender] from committing sexual 
crimes and also protecting society.”213  The degree of restrictions courts 
currently use would be well-suited for those previously adjudicated as 
 
206.  Krista L. Blaisdell, Protecting the Playground of the Twenty-First Century: 
Analyzing Computer and Internet Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1155, 1158 (2009). 
207.  Id. at 1170. 
208.  United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding there is a 
government interest in restricting the Internet use of sex offenders). 
209.  Blaisdell, supra note 206, at 1186. 
210.  United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging access 
to computers may hinder job opportunities where the Internet has become an essential tool). 
211.  United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (comparing the diminished 
privacy for supervised release to the diminished privacy expected in the prison setting). 
212.  United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding restricting 
computer and Internet use is “reasonably related” to the goal of protecting the public from an 
Internet sex offender). 
213.  Blaisdell, supra note 206, at 1175. 
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sexually violent predators, since they have discretion as to how lenient or 
strict they need to be in restricting access.214  If a court decides that 
completely barring all access to a computer is necessary to prevent a 
previous sexually violent predator from reoffending, it can impose such a 
restriction upon release.215  Even the harshest level of Internet and 
computer restriction is preferable to civil commitment, and results in a 
better balance of the two interests at issue. 
3. Electronic Monitoring 
The Jessica Lunsford Act mandated lifetime electronic surveillance 
post-release for those convicted of sexually assaulting a child under 
twelve.216  Over twenty other states have also adopted this provision.217  
Global Positioning System (“GPS”) monitoring provides another method 
for law enforcement and community corrections to protect the public from 
released offenders.218  GPS can be implemented in a variety of ways, 
modified according to the particular circumstances of each released 
offender.219  Active GPS monitoring allows for law enforcement or 
community corrections to know exactly where an offender is in near-real 
time.220  Electronic surveillance is commonly used when the court imposes 
house arrest, triggering an alert if the offender steps outside a preset 
radius.221 
Electronic surveillance can be costly, due to direct equipment cost 
and labor costs of those personnel who are in charge of the monitoring the 
offenders.  However, the cost of electronic surveillance is far less than the 
cost of placing the same offender in civil commitment.222  Additionally it 
would allow the offender to maintain his own residence and become 
rehabilitated.223  Offenders with GPS monitors are frequently given prior 
approval to leave at certain times for therapeutic treatments, such as 
counseling or group meetings.224  This flexibility would allow offenders 
currently classified as sexually violent predators access to beneficial 
 
214.  Id. at 1170. 
215.  United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding the state had the 
authority to restrict all computer and Internet use). 
216.  FLA. STAT. § 948.30 (2016). See supra Part I.A.1.d. 
217.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 90.  
218.  Matthew Demichele & Brian K. Payne, GPS Tracking and the Law Enforcement 
Role, 82 POLICE J. 134, 134 (2009). 
219.  Id. at 136. 
220.  Id. at 137.  There is a negligible delay in transmitting the information from the 
receiver.  Id. 
221.  Demichele, supra note 218, at 137. 
222.  Id. 
223.  Id.  Under house arrest, offenders could reunite with their families and “avoid the 
negative consequences associated with incarceration.”  Id. 
224.  Id. 
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activities, such as therapy, since in some states they would be offered that 
assistance in the commitment setting. 
IV. SUGGESTED STATUTORY REFORM FOR ADJUDICATING FEWER 
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS 
“To broaden this definition further would be to perpetrate an ongoing 
stereotype based in social hysteria rather than legitimate state 
interest.”225 
Rerouting sex offenders, who would currently be adjudicated as 
sexually violent predators, from civil commitment placements into 
community supervision placements would not be a simple task.  This Note 
proposes the statutory language in the Sexually Violent Predator Acts be 
reformed to allow for fewer sex offenders to be placed in civil 
commitments.  In particular, the current definition of a sexually violent 
predator is “any person who has been convicted of or charged with a 
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder which makes the person more likely to engage in the 
predatory acts of sexual violence.”226  The ambiguity in this definition is 
problematic and must be altered. 
A. Offense Requirement 
The offense requirement in the Sexually Violent Predator Acts is the 
first step in an offender’s consideration for civil commitment, and 
therefore is the first opportunity for a statutory reform to eliminate 
offenders who are not implicated in the legislative purpose of the 
SVPAs.227  The acts are meant to only impact those offenders who commit 
a violent sex offense,228 which is why the offense limitation in the acts is 
crucial.  Currently, some states have wide discretion written into their 
 
225.  Wangenheim, supra note 81, at 570. 
226.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2015). 
227.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).  The Hendricks Court explains that 
the civil commitment process is not meant for those offenders who “are perhaps more properly 
dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.”  Id.   
228.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01(a) (2015).   
The legislature finds that there exists an extremely dangerous group of sexually 
violent predators who have a mental abnormality or personality disorder and who are 
likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence if not treated for their mental 
abnormality or personality disorder.  Because the existing civil commitment 
procedures under [the general involuntary civil commitment statute] are inadequate 
to address the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks they present to 
society, the legislature determines that a separate involuntary civil commitment 
process for the potentially long-term control, care and treatment of sexually violent 
predators is necessary.   
Id. 
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prerequisite offense sections, opening the door for societal opinion to 
influence the decision-making process.229  Sex offenders are in particular 
need of protection from the influence of public opinion on the legal 
process because of the heightened negative sentiments toward sex 
offenses.230  A bright line rule is necessary to distinguish which offenses 
qualify and which do not in order to safeguard against any intentional 
societal biases. 
This Note proposes that all SVPAs must have limited discretionary 
language in the prerequisite offense requirements, similar to the current 
Missouri statute.  The Missouri statute specifically enumerates the 
offenses that qualify as: 
[F]elonies of rape in the first degree, forcible rape, rape, statutory rape 
in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, forcible sodomy, 
sodomy, statutory sodomy in the first degree, or an attempt to commit 
any of the preceding crimes, or child molestation in the first, second, 
third, or fourth degree, sexual abuse, sexual abuse in the first degree, 
rape in the second degree, sexual assault, sexual assault in the first 
degree, sodomy in the second degree, deviate sexual assault, deviate 
sexual assault in the first degree, or the act of abuse of a child 
involving either sexual contact, a prohibited sexual act, sexual abuse, 
or sexual exploitation of a minor.231 
The concluding provision adds to the definition “any offense that 
contains elements substantially similar to the offenses listed above.”232 
Although this provision does allow for some flexibility for which 
offenses should be included, it is necessary to account for new or obscure 
offenses that cannot presently be listed.233  The “substantially similar” 
standard is adequate protection because it requires the prosecutor to show 
an offender committed a sexually violent offense that has similar 
characteristics to the already listed offenses.234  The underlying nature of 
those enumerated offenses is still being used in determining the 
applicability of an offense not listed, retaining the original goal as to 
 
229.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(13) (2013) (“any offense which either at the time 
of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings pursuant to 
this act, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated”); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (2008) (“any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on 
the record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the person’s offense should be 
considered a sexually violent offense”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(2)(o) (2015). 
230.  See supra Part I.A. 
231.  MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(4) (2010 & Supp. 2014).   
232.  Id.   
233.  There is the potential for new crimes to be created due to a continuously changing 
society, most notably in sex offenses that use technology.  See Blaisdell, supra note 206, at 
1208.  Planning for the possibility of new crimes “prevents crafty criminals from identifying 
and capitalizing on loopholes in the statutory text.”  Id. 
234.  See id.   
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whom the Acts should reach.  There should be no other discretionary 
provisions other than the “substantially similar” one listed above; if the 
existence of a predicate sex offense cannot be proven under that high 
standard, then the offense was not originally meant to be impacted by the 
SVPAs, which were created to affect “a small but extremely dangerous 
group of sexually violent predators [that] exist . . . .”235  In order to keep 
this population “small,” a high standard is necessary. 
B. Mental Abnormality Requirement 
Once the offense requirement is satisfied, the prosecutor must prove 
the offender has a mental abnormality or personality disorder and prove 
that the same mental abnormality or personality disorder makes it difficult 
to control his behavior, and therefore he is likely to reoffend.236  Because 
there are multiple steps in this requirement and those steps involve the 
medical profession, it is more complex and consequently at great risk for 
error when applied in the courtroom.237 
The language used in the SVPAs is a combination of both medical 
and legal terms.238  Blending terms from these two distinct fields creates 
a lack of clarity in standards.  For instance, the mental abnormality 
standard is not a medical or scientific one; it is a product of the legal 
field.239  Mental abnormality in the SVPAs is defined as a “congenital or 
acquired condition that affects the emotional or volitional capacity, 
predisposing the person to commission of criminal sexual acts.”240  On 
one hand, the Court in the seminal Hendricks case stated that “legal 
definitions don’t need to mirror the medical profession,” while at the same 
time the Court used medical professionals to clarify whether or not 
Hendricks met the definition of a sexually violent predator.241 
 
235.  WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2014). 
236.  WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (2014).  The Washington statute is representative 
of the majority of the states’ mental abnormality provisions.  
237.  Michael B. First & Robert Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia Diagnoses in Sexually 
Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 443, 444 (2012). 
238.  John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting Risk Assessments for 
Those Already Civilly Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 
93–94 (2005).  The author presents a few cases, including Hendricks and Crane, to illustrate the 
“psycho-legal issues pertaining to the definitions of mental abnormality, volition, emotional 
abnormality, and personality disorder [because they] are quite vague and often lead to serious 
confusion.”  Id. at 93. 
239.  The term “Mental Abnormality” is not used by the medical community; instead, it 
is a specialized term created by legislatures for mental health concepts.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997).  Legislators wanted to broaden the scope beyond a strict “mental 
illness” diagnosis so the acts would include offenders who could not otherwise be reached by 
the general civil commitment statute.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01(a) (2013). 
240.  WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (2014).   
241.  First & Halon, supra note 237 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359).   
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A medical standard should be in place throughout the entire civil 
commitment process in order to reduce confusion and misapplication, in 
addition to greater specificity in terminology.  Medical experts are 
ordinarily brought in during a civil commitment proceeding to testify 
about the offender’s mental condition.242  Applying medical opinion based 
on medical standards to a legal standard does not provide the bright-line 
clarity that SVPAs should require as a safeguard against societal stigmas 
entering the courtroom.243 
Rather than applying the medical testimonial evidence to the current 
legal standard, the triers of fact should base their determination on the 
medical reasoning the professional used in making his diagnosis.  Both 
the legal and the medical decision makers would thus view the evidence 
from the same perspective. 
Using a medical framework throughout the legal process would also 
afford more standardization later, when the court reviews the offender for 
release.244  The court will release an offender from civil commitment upon 
the showing that his “mental abnormality has so changed that [he] is safe 
to be at large.”245  Medical professionals, usually from the civil 
commitment facility where the offender resides, provide their opinion to 
the court as to whether the offender still has the same mental abnormality 
that initially required his commitment.246  Legal standards are slower to 
evolve than scientific understanding, and therefore may often not be as 
up-to-date and accurate as medical knowledge.247  It is critical that 
determinations in sexually violent predator cases be based on the most 
accurate information available because of the deprivation of liberty that is 
involved. 
In order for the trier of fact in SVPA trials to make an informed 
decision from medical testimony, the court needs to provide a clear 
 
242.  Fabien, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond, supra note 123, at 91. The expert 
can discuss the different aspects of the offender’s condition, then the jury decides whether those 
aspects could satisfy the mental abnormality element.  Id. 
243.  See First & Halon, supra note 237, at 444 (explaining the vital importance of the 
medical experts’ testimony due to the “complications and subtleties involved in integrating 
clinical diagnostic information with the kinds of dysfunction required by the statutes”).  
244.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08–11(a) (2013).  An offender must be released if at any 
point during his confinement he no longer satisfies the statutory requirements.  Id. 
245.  MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495(2) (2010 & Supp. 2014). 
246.  Joan Comparet-Cassani, A Primer on the Civil Trial of a Sexually Violent Predator, 
37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1057, 1100 (2000). 
247.  Risk Assessment, supra note 85.  Courts rely on clinicians for their opinion on the 
level of “risk” or “dangerousness” that a sex offender presents.  Id.  Although there remains a 
great amount of uncertainty in the accuracy of risk assessment, research in the past decade has 
significantly increased that accuracy.  Id.  Research focused on particular sex offender types has 
shown improved accuracy by tailoring the risk assessment to the characteristics of the offender, 
as opposed to lumping all types of sex offenders together.  Id.   
2017] THE CAGE A FETISH CAN BUILD 175 
understanding of the elements that must be satisfied.  This is best 
accomplished through precise language in the statutes themselves and 
through the organized presentation of the medical evidence.  The current 
SVPAs combine multiple critical elements into one section, which results 
in misapplication and confusion of the separate elements.248  The 
perspective of the legislators who created the SVPAs was that the mental 
abnormality in question caused a lack of control and therefore was the 
reason for a high risk of recidivism, as well as the fact that the prerequisite 
violent sex offense was a product of that mental abnormality.  However, 
those distinct relationships become confused.249  Courts in a variety of 
cases use differing language in analysis of the SVPA, revealing 
inconsistencies in standards and in results.250 
CONCLUSION 
Currently over five-thousand offenders are committed throughout the 
United States,251 and most will never be released,252 despite the provision 
that they will only be held as long as their mental abnormality persists.  
Because the standard is broad, more sex offenders are in commitments 
than actually need to be for various reasons.  Offenders could be 
committed for “suffering” from a negligible paraphilia that a physician 
and judge deemed to pass the mental abnormality standard,253 or they 
could be committed because the judge used his discretion in deciding that 
their offense should be considered a sexually violent offense.254 
Through the expansion of the “sexually violent predator” definition, 
states are further strengthening public fear by creating a category, and thus 
a perception, that applies to a wider range of offenders than was originally 
intended.  The public will infer that since more offenders are being sent to 
civil commitments, their prevalence must be increasing.  That is untrue, 
and a myth that the judicial system should not be promoting. 
The government’s legitimate interest in protecting the public from 
 
248.  First & Halon, supra note 237, at 444.  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders lists the indicators of paraphilias and distinguished them from paraphilic 
disorders.  DSM-5, supra note 22, at 685–86.  A paraphilia is defined as “any intense and 
persistent sexual interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulation or preparatory fondling 
with phenotypically normal, physically mature, consenting human partners.”  Id. at 685.  
Whereas a paraphilic disorder is defined as “a paraphilia that is currently causing distress or 
impairment to the individual or a paraphilia whose satisfaction has entailed personal harm, or 
risk of harm, to others.”  Id. at 685–86. 
249.  First & Halon, supra note 237. 
250.  Comparet-Cassani, supra note 246. 
251.  ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 42, at 143.   
252.  Hamilton, supra note 14. 
253.  Ahlers et al., supra note 124, at 1366–69. 
254.  N.J. STAT. § 30:4-27.26(b) (2008). 
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the dangers of sex offenders and the sex offenders’ liberty interests are not 
being any better served in the civil commitment process than they would 
be if those designated as sexually violent predators lived in the community 
under the same restrictions as other sex offenders.  The standard for 
adjudicating someone a “sexually violent predator” under state and federal 
statutes should be narrowed to include specified mental diseases and 
specified prerequisite offenses, removing vague language and broad 
discretionary authority.  Narrowing the scope of the statutes will return 
fundamental rights to a portion of sex offenders whom the statutes were 
not originally intended to affect. 
 
